EAST-WEST CENTER
SPECIAL REPORT

Chrysanthemum and Sword Revisited

Is Japanese Militarism Resurgent?

A Gateway in Hawaii Between Asia and America
RICHARD HALLOPAN

Chrysanthemum and Sword Revisited

Is Japanese Militarism Resurgent?

THE EAST-WEST CENTER  HONOLULU, HAWAII
Contents

Is Japanese Militarism Resurgent? 1
Anxieties in America, Asia, and Japan 3
Measuring Japanese Military Power 6
Articulated Policy on National Security 9
Public Attitudes Toward Militarism 12
What Japan Could Do 17
What If? 20
Acknowledgments 21
Notes 21
Appendices 25

This Special Report is one of a series produced by the staff and visiting fellows of the Special Projects unit of the East-West Center. The series focuses on timely, critical issues concerning the United States, Asia, and the Pacific and is intended for a wide audience of those who make or influence policy decisions throughout the region.

This paper may be quoted in full or in part without further permission. Please credit the author and the East-West Center.

Please address comments or inquiries to: Special Projects, East-West Center, 1777 East-West Road, Honolulu, Hawaii, 96848.

Telephone: 808-944-7602. Fax: 808-944-7670.
Summary

For forty years, the Japanese have pursued a policy on national security that has relied on the military power of the United States, on Japan's increasing economic strength, and on what the Japanese call low posture in diplomacy. Even as Japan has been admitted to the world's highest economic councils, the Japanese have assiduously sought to avoid taking a political or military stance that might be considered controversial or aggressive. To borrow from Ruth Benedict, the Japanese have almost exclusively cultivated the chrysanthemum and foresworn the sword ever since they sheathed it at the end of World War II.

Today, however, some Americans, many Asians, and most Japanese themselves are asking whether Japan will once again turn to the sword as an instrument of national policy. This is perhaps the crucial question that overshadows discussions of Japan's foreign policy. There is widespread anxiety that the Japanese will expand their military forces and that those forces might embark on the sort of ventures that set Asia aflame between the invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and the defeat of Japan in 1945. That concern, in turn, invites intense scrutiny, abroad and at home, of every proposal and decision in Japan's international relations.

The fear of resurgent Japanese militarism was clearly at the bottom of Japan's agonizing national debate in 1990 and 1991 over what part it might play in the Persian Gulf crisis. Many Americans, Asians, and Japanese themselves asserted that any action by Japan beyond economic support for the United States and its allies would be seen as the first step toward the revival of Japan as a military power.

But fifty years after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor brought America into World War II, a dispassionate examination of the evidence suggests that the danger of a resurgence in Japanese militarism is remote.

Such a revival would be marked by three developments, none of which is seen on the horizon: Japan would build a military force commensurate with the nation's population and economic power; the Japanese would be willing to use that military power to obtain political and economic objectives; and military leaders in Japan would play an influential role in national life.

Japan's current military capabilities and those planned for the foreseeable future, however, indicate that Japan will remain a minor military power with little more than a modest, defensive force. The articulated policies of all Japanese governments since the end of the Allied Occupation forty years ago show no plan to build a military force commensurate with Japan's economic strength or population.

Equally important, there is little evidence in the Japanese public of any desire to see their nation become a major military power. To the contrary, the pacifist streak that has run through Japanese society for four decades after the devastation of World War II remains strong. Taken together, the absence of government policies and the public's resistance to militarism argue that the requisite political will for militarism does not exist in Japan today.

On the other hand, the Japanese would undoubtedly have the money, technology, industrial capacity, and people to field a formidable force if they decided to acquire military power. A look at the "what if's" that might trigger such a buildup strongly suggests that a withdrawal of American forces from Asia would cause the Japanese to reconsider their military posture. Other developments, such as the emergence of an aggressive China, would affect Japanese thinking, but not to the degree that would be caused by a shift in United States policy.

In sum, it seems that Japan will remain an economic giant and a military pigmy relative to the world's other major and middle-sized powers.

Mr. Halloran has written four books: Japan: Images and Realities, Conflict and Compromise: The Dynamics of American Foreign Policy, To Arm a Nation: Rebuilding America’s Endangered Defenses, and Serving America: Prospects for the Volunteer Force. He was graduated from Dartmouth College with an A.B. in government-international relations in 1951 and earned an M.A. in East Asian Studies at the University of Michigan in 1957. He also studied at the East Asia Institute at Columbia University on a Ford Foundation Fellowship in 1964–1965.
In her pioneering book, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, the anthropologist Ruth Benedict asserted that Japan was at one and the same time a land of peace and war. She said the Japanese not only heap high honors on artists and lavishly tend to chrysanthemums but bestow great prestige on warriors and are equally devoted to the cult of the sword. "Both the sword and the chrysanthemum," Benedict concluded during World War II, "are part of the picture."¹

For a nation to present both peaceful and warlike faces to the world is not unusual. The symbolic American eagle carries an olive branch in one claw, arrows in the other. Britain produced William Shakespeare and Admiral Horatio Nelson, Germany was home to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, Russia bred Peter Ilyich Tchaikovsky and the Cossacks.

The difference in this case is that the Japanese have almost exclusively cultivated the chrysanthemum and foresworn the sword ever since they sheathed it at the end of World War II. Today, however, many Americans, Asians, and the Japanese themselves are asking whether Japan is once again turning to the sword as an instrument of national policy.
It is a critical issue, perhaps the crucial question that overshadows discussions of Japan’s foreign policy and national security. There is widespread concern that an expanded Japanese military force would not be defensive but would be offensive and aggressive. That possibility causes anxiety that Japan might embark on the sort of ventures that set Asia aflame between the invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and the defeat of Japan in 1945. That anxiety, in turn, invites intense scrutiny, abroad and at home, of every proposal and decision in Japan’s international relations.

The fear of resurgent Japanese militarism was clearly at the bottom of Japan’s agonizing national debate in 1990 and 1991 over what part it might play in the Persian Gulf crisis. Many Americans, Asians, and Japanese themselves asserted that any action by Japan beyond economic support for the United States and its allies would be seen, or might even be, the first step toward the revival of Japan as a military power.

In the end, the Japanese sent no combatant or non-combatant forces to the Gulf but limited themselves to writing checks totalling $13 billion to help pay for the expensive military operation. The debate itself, however, appeared to have persuaded the Japanese that they could no longer remain in the political cocoon in which they had wrapped themselves since 1945. Instead, Japan began to take, ever so cautiously and tentatively, a more visible but decidedly non-military posture in the international arena. After the war, Japan dispatched four minesweepers and two support ships to the Gulf to help clear shipping lanes.

The possibility that the United States will withdraw altogether from Asia and turn to a neo-isolationist foreign policy;

- The uncertain role of Soviet military power in Asia and the Pacific as that troubled nation decides its future;
- Plans that the leaders of China, especially those who will emerge over the next decade, have for their nation’s military forces;
- The chances for reunification of South and North Korea, which might join two of the world’s largest military forces, or, conversely, the possibility that a new war might erupt on that divided peninsula;
- Vietnam’s unpredictable objectives for its military forces at home and elsewhere in Southeast Asia;
- The potential for Indonesian or Malaysian threats to Singapore and the shipping lanes between the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean.
- India’s long-term military, and especially naval, plans plus Pakistan’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, and the chance of renewed warfare in South Asia.

The possibility of a revived Japanese militarism that arouses such fear among the Japanese themselves and all nations washed by the Pacific and Indian Oceans would be marked by three developments:

1) Japan would build a military force commensurate with the nation’s population and economic strength, meaning a force a little over half the size of that of the United States;

2) The Japanese would be willing to use military power as an instrument of national policy as they did from 1868 to 1945, and especially in the 1930s and 1940s;

3) The leaders of Japan’s armed forces would
play an influential role in the political, economic, and social life of their nation.

Fifty years after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor brought America into World War II, the anxieties of some Americans, many Asians, and most Japanese over a possible revival of Japanese militarism is palpable. A dispassionate examination of the evidence, however, suggests that the danger of such a resurgence is remote.

Japan's current military capabilities and those planned for the foreseeable future indicate that Japan will remain a minor military power with little more than a modest, defensive force. The articulated policies of all Japanese governments since the end of the Allied Occupation forty years ago show no plan to build a military force commensurate with Japan's economic strength or population.

Equally important, there is little evidence in the Japanese public of any desire to see their nation become a major military power. To the contrary, the pacifist streak that has run through Japanese society for four decades after the devastation of World War II remains strong. Taken together, the absence of government policies and the public's resistance to militarism argue that the requisite political will for militarism does not exist in Japan today. Without that political will, no nation could acquire and maintain a sizeable military force.

On the other hand, the Japanese would undoubtedly have the money, technology, industrial capacity, and people to field a formidable force if their political will changed and they decided to acquire military power. A look at the "what if's" that might trigger such a buildup strongly suggests that a withdrawal of American forces from Asia would cause the Japanese seriously to reconsider their military posture. Other developments, such as the emergence of an aggressive China, would affect Japanese thinking, but not to the degree that would be caused by a shift in United States policy and posture.

**Anxieties in America, Asia, and Japan**

Concerns about a new Japanese militarism have cropped up repeatedly in America during the last several years. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger warned in 1987 that Japanese economic strength made it "inevitable that Japan will emerge as a major military power in the not-too-distant future."2 Geneva Overholser, an editorial writer for The New York Times and later editor of the Des Moines Register, returned from Beijing in 1988 to reflect Chinese fears of Japan. She quoted a Chinese official worried about a "rightist, racist, ultranationalistic, militaristic" tendency in Japan.3

By 1990, American concern was expressed with increasing frequency. A senior Marine Corps officer in Okinawa, Major General Henry C. Stackpole, arguing against a reduction of American forces in Asia, asserted: "No one wants a rearmed, resurgent Japan. So we are a cap in the bottle, if you will."4 Dov S. Zakheim, a senior Pentagon official in the Reagan administration, cautioned: "Only Japan is in a position to fill any power vacuum that a drawdown of U.S. and Soviet forces might create."5 A Defense Department report to Congress said: "Increases in Japanese military strength undertaken to compensate for declining U.S. capabilities in the region could prove worrisome to regional nations."6

Susumu Awanohara, a Japanese correspondent for the Far Eastern Economic Review, pointed out what he called an American
dilemma. On the one hand, he said, the United States wanted Japan to carry a greater share of the burden for the common defense in Asia. "On the other hand," he wrote, "the Americans are realizing how much of Asia still resents Japanese militarism. Fear of resurgent Japanese military prowess is also extant in the United States itself."  

After the Persian Gulf crisis erupted in August, 1990, the issue boiled up in full force. Japan joined with other nations in placing an embargo on trade with Iraq and pledged $4 billion in aid and loans to assist nations that were sending military forces to the region. Later Japan pledged another $9 billion in aid. But the sticking point throughout the debate was whether Japan should dispatch military forces to join the coalition confronting Iraq.

President Bush's administration urged the Japanese to undertake a modest, non-combatant role. After the Pacific summit meeting in Hawaii in October, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Solomon said the administration was trying to get the Japanese "to participate in this Gulf crisis in some way that goes beyond just writing checks for the tremendous cost of this operation." He said Washington wanted Japan "to engage in peacekeeping operations in many parts of the world."  

But many Americans disagreed. The retired executive editor of The New York Times, A. M. Rosenthal, argued against dispatching Japanese forces to the combat zone. If Japan deployed such forces, the one-time Tokyo correspondent for the Times said in a column: "Count on this: The Japanese Army will soon again become a military force at home, a constant threat to the delicate, complex civilian equilibrium that is now the base and protection of Japan's democratic society."  

Among Asians, the fear of Japanese militarism ran through a special supplement of the Japan Economic Journal on Japan's ever more influential place in Asia. "Japan's role as Big Brother is hindered by haunting memories of the Imperial Army's occupation 50 years ago," the magazine said. "Memories are especially bitter in China and the Koreas, countries that long suffered under Japanese colonization."  

Chinese officials in Beijing and South Korean officials in Seoul confirmed those fears. "I don't see it right now," said an official of Hsin Hua, the Chinese news agency, "but I worry about it." The Chinese expressed grave reservations about the deployment of Japanese minesweepers to the Persian Gulf in 1991. South Koreans said they feared Japanese economic domination and were concerned that renewed militarism might be right behind it.  

Officially, South Korea did not object to the dispatch of the Japanese minesweepers to the Persian Gulf, but privately some Koreans had misgivings. An Indonesian scholar, Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti, was quoted in the Japan Economic Journal: "We saw the return of Japanese capital, and that brought up all the memories of the war period."  

Bilveer Singh, director of the Singapore Institute of International Affairs, said: "America can come and go. The Russians can come and go. But Japan will be here. We have to live with the Japanese but we don't trust them... If they ever apply their efficiency to the military in the same way they have applied it to their economy, we've had it."  

The question of Japanese militarism came up during a meeting of Southeast Asian foreign ministers in Indonesia in July, 1990. The foreign minister of Malaysia, Abu Hassan Omar, cited the decline in tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union and wondered if Japan would replace the Soviet Union as a threat to Southeast Asian security. The minister said after the meeting: "We wanted to get an assurance from them that they won't be any security threat."  

Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama of Japan and Secre-
tary of State James Baker of the United States sought to give such assurances.  

A Western diplomat at the meeting said: “Malaysia was only expressing publicly what most Southeast Asian countries have always said privately.”  

Keith Richburg, the Washington Post's correspondent, wrote: “Omar's remark here caused barely a ripple, in part because of the visceral suspicion of Japan in this region runs in many ways deeper than the concerns that Europeans have about a unified Germany.”  

Sueo Sudo, a fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, summed it up: “The most contentious aspect of Japan's role in the region is security, as the region is in the midst of a security debate concerning the advent of a power vacuum.” Another scholar at the institute, S. Javed Maswood, agreed: “Their (nations in the region) apprehensions of a revival of the past is accentuated by Japan's economic dominance and the feeling that this dominance could, over time, be juxtaposed with military dominance unless ceaseless vigilance continues.”  

Perhaps no place, however, has the anxiety been so intense as in Japan itself. Early in the Gulf crisis, Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu proposed legislation that would have permitted the dispatch of units from the Self-Defense Force, as Japan's armed force is called, for non-combatant duty under the flag of the United Nations. But the opposition was so strong that the government was compelled to withdraw the bill.  

Yukiko Tsunoda, a lawyer, seemed to express the fears of many Japanese. She contended that Japanese conservatives “want Japan to have military muscle commensurate with its industrial and financial clout.” Ms. Tsunoda argued that “the first step, as they see it, is to legalize the deployment of troops abroad. Saddam Hussein provided the perfect pretext.” Ms. Tsunoda asserted that the government's proposal “was the carefully thought-out first step of a master plan to turn Japan into a major military power.”  

Many Japanese pointed to the fears of other Asians. Makoto Kawanago, a staff researcher at the Research Institute for Peace and Security, wrote: “Other Asian countries are scared of Japan not simply because it might become a military power, but because the Japanese blamed the war on their old military leaders and now act as if nothing at all happened.”  

Yoichi Funabashi, a columnist for the Asahi Shimbun, a leading newspaper in Tokyo, also asserted that Japanese have been reluctant to face up to their recent past, which generates distrust all over Asia. “The perception that Japan still has not come to terms with its own past,” he concluded, “puts the most fundamental constraint on effective and successful foreign policy.”  

In the same vein, Kumao Kaneko, professor of international relations at Tokai University, lamented that even though “Japanese insist this country will never again become a major military power, .... our neighbors don't trust us.” Yasuaki Onuma, professor of international law at Tokyo University, said that what prevents Japan from playing a greater role in the world “is the specter of Japanese troops on the march again.” The deputy director general of the Self-Defense Agency's policy bureau, Jiro Hagi, said: “We think we should send the Self-Defense Forces to the Middle East, but most of the opposition parties and most of the Japanese people don't agree. And especially countries that were occupied by Japan during the war—they have some critical feeling that Japan may become a military power again.”  

Not all Americans or Asians were so worried. William Safire, a columnist in The New York Times, wrote: “Japan should get serious about getting involved” in the Gulf crisis and should send a large medical contingent.  

Is Japanese Militarism Resurgent?
“These Japanese citizens,” he contended, “will be putting their lives on the line, reflecting honor on their nation.”

A former foreign minister of Malaysia, Tan Sri Mohammed Ghazali Shafie, told a Japanese audience in Tokyo in March, 1990, before the Gulf crisis, that “Japan’s crude imitation of Western colonialism inflicted immeasurable pain and suffering and aroused a general feeling of outrage” in Southeast Asia. But the Malaysian leader went on to contend that colonialism and militarism have become “bad dreams of the past and Japan will not have them again. Of that I feel certain.”

A few prominent Japanese have also argued that the threat of militarism has passed. During the debate over Japan’s role in the Persian Gulf crisis, a former director of the Cabinet Security Affairs Office asserted that Japanese forces “should be used overseas for peaceful purposes.” Atsuyuki Sassa, who headed a small Japanese version of the Central Intelligence Agency, contended: “Widespread opposition to direct involvement in the Gulf war shows how self-indulgent Japanese have become. ‘Let the other fellow do the dirty work’ is now a part of the national psyche.”

But those voices were drowned in a sea of vocal protest against the dispatch of Japanese forces. In the end, Japan did little more than to write checks for the expensive operation. During a visit to Hawaii in April, 1991, former Prime Minister Nakasone sought to explain that: “Since after World War II, the prominent feeling of most Japanese is no matter what happens, Japan will sustain a peaceful posture.”

“At times, this posture of Japan, the doggedness of our non-combat attitude, may have been looked upon as selfish or egotistical,” Mr. Nakasone continued. “But the reality is that so much of the population of Japan hated the war because of the disastrous experience they went through.”

**Measuring Japanese Military Power**

A critical indicator of Japan’s intentions is the actual military power that Japan has acquired since 1952, when the Allied Occupation ended and the Japanese regained their national sovereignty. Such military power does not exist in a vacuum and is significant only when measured against the armed forces of other nations.

Since numbers often count in military strength, an objective gauge of Japan’s present military power must include several sets of numbers. But no single number is conclusive. Most numbers expressed in dollars vary with exchange rates. Some are not exact comparisons because Japanese accounting methods often differ from those of other nations. Taken together, however, the numbers all point in the same direction.

As a percentage of national wealth, Japan spends on defense the smallest amount, 1 percent of gross national product, of any sizeable nation. Given the size of the Japanese economy, however, that 1 percent puts Japan in a class with other industrial nations that spend 3 percent or 4 percent. Japan spends about $30 billion a year and ranks between third and sixth in the world, depending on exchange rates. (The Soviet Union and the United States are one and two.) That sum puts Japan in the same league with France, Britain, and West Germany before reunification with East Germany.

But the growth rate of Japanese military spending appears to be slowing. During the 1980s, Japan’s military spending increased an average of 6.4 percent a year, or roughly the same rate as the expansion of the Japanese economy. The ratio of military spending to gross national product thus remained around 1 percent. The Mid-Term Defense
Plan from 1991 through 1995, however, calls for a growth rate of only 3 percent a year, or less than the projected growth rate of the economy.31

Moreover, ranking Japan with the leading industrial nations of Europe is misleading because the Japanese do not get nearly so much military power for their money as do the United States and other Western nations.

The Japanese spend 40 percent of their military budget on personnel,32 compared with 27 percent in the United States.33 Although that portion of the military budget has declined in recent years, Japan is still left with fewer yen to buy weapons, equipment, and ammunition. In addition, Japan spends 10 percent of its defense budget, or $3 billion, on support for American forces in Japan, such as land rent and wages for Japanese working on American bases.34 That is 50 percent of the yen cost for those bases; by 1996, according to an agreement between the Japanese and American governments in 1991, the Japanese will pay for 100 percent of the yen costs for American forces in Japan.35 Not only does each yen spent for that support mean a yen less for Japanese spending for its own military forces, but the Japanese spend fully one-half of their defense budget before they buy the first bullet.

In procuring arms, ammunition, and equipment, Japan spends about same ratio of its military budget as the United States, which is 27 percent.36 But Japanese costs per item are higher in many cases because they buy smaller numbers and do not get economies of scale.


For instance, an M-1 tank like those employed by American forces against Iraq costs the American taxpayer $4.4 million apiece as the Pentagon buys 225 to 480 a year.37 Japan’s new Type-90 tank, which is lighter and less capable, costs $8.6 million, with only 30 being ordered this year.38 The United States Navy is paying $713 million each for its new DDG-51 destroyers.39 A 7,200-ton ship of roughly the same size, but with less capable equipment, costs $967 million in Japan.40 The United States Air Force buys F-15 jet fighters for $50 million.41 In Japan, an older version of the same plane costs $66 million.42

In another category of Japan’s military budget, the Japanese spend 16 percent on operations and maintenance,43 compared with 30 percent in the United States.44 That means Japanese training and ability to sustain military operations lag behind those of the United States, which has also become more efficient in recent years. American military officers say, however, that Japan’s maintenance is excellent, which keeps up the readiness of equipment for use.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms, Equipment, Supplies</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations and Maintenance</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research and Development</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Construction</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support U.S. Forces in Japan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: May not add due to rounding. Sources: U.S. Department of Defense, Japan Self-Defense Agency.

Is Japanese Militarism Resurgent? 7
Allocations in Japan's Military Budget, 1985-1990
(Percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>FY85</th>
<th>FY86</th>
<th>FY87</th>
<th>FY88</th>
<th>FY89</th>
<th>FY90</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>40.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R &amp; D*</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O &amp; M**</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Bases</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*R & D = Research and Development  
**O & M = Operations and Maintenance  
Sources: Japan Economic Institute, Defense White Paper 1990.

Looking to the future, the Japanese spend only 2.2 percent of their defense yen on research and development, compared with 12.6 percent in the United States, which indicates that they are not investing in the weapons of tomorrow. (Both nations get some support from technical innovations generated by civilian industry.)

In size, Japan's armed forces number 246,500, of which 156,100 are in the army, 44,000 in the navy, and 46,300 in the air force. Altogether, the Self-Defense Force has a shortage of 27,200 people, of which the army has a shortage of 23,900. Japan's army and air force together are about same size as the United States Marine Corps, the smallest of America's four armed forces.

Around the world, 24 nations have armed forces larger than those of Japan (Appendix A). In Asia, Japan ranks 10th, after China, India, Vietnam, North Korea, South Korea, Pakistan, Taiwan, Indonesia, and Thailand (Appendix B). This does not count Soviet or U. S. forces, both of which are extensive in Asia. Size is not everything in military power, by any means, as the quality of weapons and the skill of leaders and soldiers can overcome shortages in people. Even so, size does give an indication of military strength.

The Pentagon, using a formula that takes into account numbers of people, firepower, training, and other measures of military power, has compared Japan with the 15 industrial nations in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The study found that Japan ranks eighth in military manpower, between Spain and Greece, and ninth, between Spain and the Netherlands, in ground forces. In fighter and attack aircraft, Japan ranks eighth, between Turkey and Spain (Appendix C).

Only in one category, warships, does Japan rank near the top. As might be expected of an island, maritime nation, Japan ranks fourth, between France and Germany. Even so, Japan's navy is much smaller than those of the United States and the Soviet Union, which have 3.2 million tons and 2.6 million tons of combat vessels afloat respectively. Japan, at 242,000 tons, compares with France at 229,000 tons (Appendix D).

A critical issue, and one that military observers in the United States and Asia have been watching keenly, is whether Japan will begin building aircraft carriers that could project power. Japanese and American officials both say there are no plans on the drawing board. Nonetheless, speculation persists. Two Australian naval officers, writing in the Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, have asserted: "It is increasingly apparent that the question is no longer if, but when, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force will press for an aircraft carrier."

Japan has many high-tech weapons, but the purpose and capabilities of those weapons must be considered. The F-15, for instance, is the world's most high-powered fighter in speed, turning radius, and armament. But the
F-15J, the model in Japan’s Air Self-Defense Force, was designed to defend Japan by shooting down enemy aircraft heading for Japan; only with an extensive overhaul could the F-15J be turned into an offensive weapon.

Indeed, Japan has few weapons to project power beyond the shores of Japan. The Japanese have no nuclear arms. They also have no long-range bombers, no long-range missiles, little long-range transport, no aerial tankers. So far, there are no nuclear-powered attack submarines and only a handful of amphibious ships, besides an absence of aircraft carriers.66

Moreover, Japan lacks the ability to organize and deploy forces from the army, navy, and air force together. Japan’s command-and-control apparatus is deficient. Katsukichi Tsukamoto, a retired lieutenant general of the Self-Defense Force and a specialist on communications, said that Japanese systems “are some thirteen years behind” those of the United States because such systems have been neglected by defense planners.67 American officers agreed. In addition, the ability to gather and analyze combat intelligence is almost nonexistent. Stocks of ammunition, spare parts, and supplies to sustain operations are restricted.68 Shortages of people have cut into readiness, with some ships unable to sail because they have only half-crews.69

Thus, Japanese and American observers say, Japan’s overall military capabilities are limited. The Japan Economic Institute, a research organization in Washington financed by the Japanese government, reported in 1990: “Even with completion of the FY1986–FY1990 military buildup program and attainment of most of the outline’s objectives, Japan’s military will still not be able to provide an effective defense out to 1,000 nautical miles.”70 James Auer, a scholar at Vanderbilt University and a former Defense Department official specializing in Japanese matters, wrote in 1991: “The Self-Defense Forces, which have been limited to certain types of equipment with an exclusively defensive character, are not able to defend even Japanese territory autonomously, i.e., without the U.S. security umbrella.”71 A Pentagon report on allied contributions to the common defense made the same point.72

During the Gulf crisis, American officers understood why the Bush administration wanted Japan to deploy forces to the region. But Navy officers said privately the Japanese had neither the experience nor the training to make a military contribution. “They would not add to the force,” said one officer. “They would just be something to deal with.”73

In sum, Japan has a modest conventional or non-nuclear military force that is reasonably well-armed and equipped but one that is limited by high costs and various deficiencies. Most important, Japan’s force is defensive in posture and lacks a capability to project military power much beyond its national shores.

Articulated Policy on National Security

Many governments do not speak the truth when disclosing specific military policies in public. But over time, their pronouncements and actions gradually provide a clear picture of where they stand.

Japan’s articulated military policy begins with Article IX of Japan’s Constitution, adopted in 1947. In its standard translation into English, it says:

“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign
right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

"In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency will never be maintained."

Article IX has been open to many interpretations. General Douglas MacArthur, the American proconsul of the Occupation under whose guidance the article was written, was among the first to proclaim that Japan was not to be denied the right of self-defense. The general said so after the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union had broken out in Europe in the late 1940s but before the Korean War began in June, 1950. In his New Year's message to the Japanese in 1950, he stated: "By no sophistry of reasoning can the constitutional renunciation of war be interpreted as complete negation of the inalienable right of self-defense against unprovoked attack."
The San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952, which ended the state of war between Japan and most Allied nations, also recognized Japan's right to self-defense. Japan's Supreme Court, in a ruling on Article IX in 1959, said: "Certainly there is nothing in it which would deny the right of self-defense inherent in our nation as a sovereign power. The pacifism advanced in our Constitution was never intended to mean defenselessness or non-resistance."

But not all Japanese, even the courts, agree that the Self-Defense Force is constitutional. The District Court in Sapporo, on the northern island of Hokkaido, where a large portion of the Japanese army is posted, ruled in 1973 that the Self-Defense Forces were unconstitutional and violated the second provision of Article IX because of their arms, equipment, and capabilities.

The ruling Liberal-Democratic Party has long asserted that the Self-Defense Force is legitimate. The Komeito, which is the political arm of the Soka Gakkai sect of Buddhism, declared during a party convention in 1981 that the force was constitutional. But the Japan Socialist Party, recently renamed the Social Democratic Party in its English version, in its 1984 convention took the position, which may appear contradictory to the Western mind, that the force was unconstitutional but legal.

Nonetheless, the majority of the Japanese seem to have accepted the existence of the Self-Defense Force albeit, again, with what may appear to be tortured reasoning. Many Japanese have argued that Article IX forbids Japan from having armed forces to project power, as stated in the first paragraph of the article. But, by implication, they contend that Article IX permits Japan to have armed forces for other reasons, namely, self-defense. It is almost as if there was a third provision to Article IX that might read:

"Nothing in the above provisions, however, denies Japan the sovereign right to maintain armed forces appropriate for the defense of the nation."

Thus, a National Police Reserve of 75,000 people was established in 1950; that became the National Safety Force of 117,000 people in 1952 and the present Self-Defense Force, with an initial complement of 152,000 people, in 1954. The legislation establishing those forces has been generally viewed as not permitting the dispatch of Japanese forces outside of Japan for combat operations.

The first prominent policy statement governing the Self-Defense Force was issued by the cabinet in May, 1957. The Basic Policy for National Defense said: "The objective of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression but, once invaded, to repel..."
such aggression.” It said Japan would support the United Nations, promote love of country, and develop “effective defense capabilities.”

But the policy also said Japan would deal “with external aggression on the basis of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, pending the effective functioning of the United Nations in the future in deterring and repelling such aggression.”72 The cabinet thus suggested that not only would Japan’s forces have no offensive capability but they would depend on the United States for the security of Japan, a departure from sovereign responsibilities.

Subsequent Japanese cabinets elaborated on the defensive posture of Self-Defense Force. In 1967, the cabinet of Prime Minister Eisaku Sato said Japan would not make, acquire, or allow nuclear weapons to be introduced into Japan. The Japanese were slow to ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 and did not agree to it until 1976, largely because the government thought it discriminated against non-nuclear nations and that it would inhibit the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in Japan.73 A tacit transit agreement with the United States made in 1960, however, permits American warships to carry their normal loads of nuclear weapons in and out of Japan, but not to store them there nor to deploy them from Japan.74

The cabinet of Prime Minister Takeo Miki in 1976 limited military spending to 1 percent of gross national product. Successive cabinets have kept military spending in that range; there are no serious signs that Japan intends to go beyond that limit even though military spending edged over 1 percent of GNP for three years beginning in 1987.75

Mr. Miki’s cabinet also discarded the three-and five-year plans that had governed Japan’s military spending and forged a National Defense Program Outline that still guides Japanese military thinking today. The outline stated that Japan would acquire enough military power to help, with the cooperation of the United States, repel an armed invasion.76

Under American pressure, Prime Minister Zentaro Suzuki pledged to President Ronald Reagan in 1981 that Japan would acquire enough military power to defend its air and sea lanes out to 1,000 miles from shore. As seen earlier, Japan has yet to fulfill that commitment.77

In 1986, the Japanese government established a Security Council within the cabinet to deliberate security issues. Chaired by the prime minister, it includes the foreign and finance ministers, the director general of the Self-Defense Agency, and several other ministers and agency directors general.78 But Japanese officials say privately the council does little and is only a rubber stamp for decisions made elsewhere in the government.79

The latest Defense White Paper, published in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Budget</th>
<th>% of GNP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2,230</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>2,586</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>2,754</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>2,935</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>3,137</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>3,344</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>3,517</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>3,700</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>3,920</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>4,159</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Japan Economic Institute, Japan Self-Defense Agency

Is Japanese Militarism Resurgent?
September, 1990, says Japan will gradually build up its capacity for self-defense to reflect its national strength. But the descriptions of ground, naval, and air forces are all in defensive terms. Japan will not become, it says, “a military power which might pose a threat to other countries.” The white paper says Japan cannot possess offensive weapons such as “ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles), long-range strategic bombers, and offensive aircraft carriers.”

Perhaps most unusual, since few other nations have been so explicit, is the acknowledged continuation of the 33-year-old reliance on the United States for the defense of Japan if a military threat appears. “It is impossible,” the white paper says in its English version, “for Japan to establish its own defense system capable of coping with any conceivable developments ranging from all-out warfare involving the use of nuclear weapons to aggression in every conceivable form using conventional weapons.” Therefore, it says, Japan will rely primarily for security not on its own forces but on those of the United States under the Mutual Security Treaty.

The white paper reaffirms the constitutional provisions for civilian control of the Self-Defense Force and recalls the era before and during World War II when militarists governed Japan. “Reflecting our self-criticism and regret about the military's behavior until the end of World War II,” the paper says, “Japan has adopted strict civilian control similar to that in other democratic countries.”

In one of the few forthright statements from a Japanese since the end of World War II, Prime Minister Kaifu expressed in Singapore in May, 1991, “our sincere contrition for past Japanese actions which inflicted unbearable suffering and sorrow upon a great many people of the Asia-Pacific region.” Mr. Kaifu asserted: “The Japanese people are firmly resolved never again to repeat those actions, which had tragic consequences.”

In sum, there has been no evidence in articulated policy for 45 years that Japan again intends to become an aggressive military power.

Public Attitudes Toward Militarism

An axiom of international relations holds that foreign policy, including that pertaining to security and military policy, is rooted in domestic politics. That is true even in authoritarian nations, as has been seen in the Soviet Union in recent years. It is all the more true where governments are responsive to public opinion.

Public attitudes toward a possible resurgence in Japanese militarism are rooted in Japanese history. At first glance, Japan appears to have had a long warlike tradition. Under scrutiny, however, that tradition is less imposing and aggressive than it first appears.

It is a striking fact that Japan has never produced a great military captain. Many Japanese have been good soldiers, brave warriors, competent tacticians. But Japan has had no military strategists on the order of Alexander, Genghis Khan, or Napoleon. Nor has Japan produced a military thinker on the order of Sun Tzu or Clausewitz or Alfred Thayer Mahan.

Moreover, before the opening of Japan to the West in 1868, all but one of Japan’s wars were civil wars fought by a small class of warriors known as samurai. The Japanese engaged in only one invasion of another country, an expedition to Korea in the late 16th century.
Hideyoshi, the general who led that venture, underscored the strategic ineptitude of Japan's military leaders as he failed to protect his supply lines across the sea between Korea and Japan and was done in by the Korean navy. He also failed to foresee the resistance of Korean guerrillas or the armed response of the Chinese.\(^{85}\)

The samurai who ruled Japan for 800 years before the modern period comprised the top 5 percent of the nation's population and were more often concerned with governing the country than with soldiering. Like the knight in shining armor of medieval Europe, moreover, the samurai was something of an idealized, romantic dream as most of his days were spent in the humdrum of bureaucratic administration.\(^{86}\)

Bushido, the Way of the Warrior that has influenced the life and culture of Japan, was less a call to military action and more a code for a way of life. It prescribed a disciplined set of values such as loyalty, obedience, respect for parents and the aged, compassion for the young, moderation in all things, returning good for evil, and a willingness to die for a cause.\(^{87}\)

In modern times, bushido was corrupted by the militarists who accrued power in the 1920s and 1930s as they sought to justify their actions with historical precedent. Benedict said modern bushido was “a publicist's inspiration.” She wrote: “It became a slogan of the nationalists and militarists and the concept was discredited with the discrediting of those leaders” after the defeat of World War II.\(^{88}\) The historical virtues of bushido, however, may still exist in contemporary Japan.

After 1868, Japan competed with Western nations and Russia for imperial power in Asia and was successful in wars against China and Russia. But Japan's experience during World War II is instructive about the quality of Japanese military leadership. In the early days, the Japanese showed operational skill in the attack on Pearl Harbor, the invasion of the Philippines, the conquest of Malaya and Singapore. They won victories in swift, carefully planned and well-executed operations. But there it ended, for the Japanese leaders demonstrated little imagination for exploiting their victories in sustained campaigns.

Indeed, Japan's rulers were proven to be strategically ignorant. Going to war against the United States and Britain, after already having been at war in China for four years and always in danger of being attacked by the Soviet Union, was madness. It will surely go down in history as the consummate military blunder of the 20th century.

General Hideki Tojo, Japan's wartime prime minister, reflected the provincial outlook of many Japanese leaders of that era in his ignorance of the outside world. The son of an army officer, Tojo had himself risen through the ranks of the officer corps in steady but notably unspectacular fashion through hard work. He served in Manchuria, where he acquired the nickname “Razor” for his sharp staff work, but was little exposed to the world outside the army, to say nothing of the world outside of Japan. He became prime minister largely as a compromise candidate who had made few enemies in his career.\(^{89}\)

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, who had studied at Harvard and had been a naval attaché in Washington, warned Japan's other military leaders not to attack the United States because that would only awaken a sleeping giant. But even he was unwilling to go against the tide of his compatriots, some of whom threatened to assassinate him, a highly plausible menace at the time. Moreover, he was also a gambler who thought maybe Japan could pull it off despite the odds.\(^{90}\) Yamamoto was shot down in the South Pacific in 1943.
On the contemporary scene, the enthronement of the new emperor, Akihito, in 1990 gave little hint of militarism. The emperor emphasized his allegiance to the Constitution, and there was no review of troops on white horseback as in earlier years. The military was limited to firing a twenty-one gun salute and having the Self-Defense Force band play. The main security problem during the ceremonies was not from would-be militarists but from left-wingers protesting against the imperial system and, by implication, resurgent militarism.91

Polls suggest Japanese attitudes toward military power. In 1989, the Dentsu Institute of Human Studies found that only 13 percent of the Japanese thought their nation should take a role of leadership in the world. Only 0.7 percent thought that Japan should be responsible for a larger share of military support in line with its economic resources.92

The 1990 Defense White Paper reported that 77 percent of the Japanese surveyed said the most useful role of the Self Defense Force was not national security but disaster relief; only 8 percent thought the forces were intended to defend the country. That 77 percent is an astonishing figure as most people in most other nations consider the mission of their armed forces to be the defense of the nation or, in some authoritarian countries, to keep a regime in power. In response to another question, 67 percent said the status quo with the SDF and the security treaty with the United States is best for Japan—only 7 percent said the security treaty should be abolished and the SDF reduced.93

Some Japanese are voting with their feet. Not only is the SDF having recruiting problems, but 15 percent of the 425 graduates of the National Defense Academy (Japan’s combined West Point, Annapolis, and Air Force Academy) turned down commissions when they graduated in 1990 to take better jobs in industry.94 In 1991, that figure climbed to 19 percent when 94 of the 494 graduates turned down commissions after the taxpayers had paid for their educations.95 The graduates had no obligation to serve; in the United States, a graduate of the service academies owes the taxpayers at least five years of active duty. (In 1992, that obligation becomes six years.)

An official in the American Embassy in Tokyo may have summed up the Japanese attitude best when he said: "There is a rampant suspicion of the military by other Japanese.”96

That public sentiment in Japan, as in other modern nations, is often reflected by serious writers. Hiroshi Miyazaki, a senior executive at Bungei Shunju, a prestigious publishing house, said: “It is obvious that there are only a very small minority who dream about Japan as a great military power or who advocate militarism. In fiction, I don’t know of any novelist who advocates the rise of militarism.”97

The last prominent writer to urge that Japan again become a military power was Yukio Mishima in 1970. “Prewar Japan banished the chrysanthemum from our national life,” he once wrote, “but postwar Japan has outlawed the sword and by so doing has broken the totality of Japanese culture.”98

Mishima went to the Self-Defense Agency in November that year and appeared on a balcony to exhort the staff, many of whom were milling about outside on a mid-day break. He urged them to restore the prestige of the emperor, purge corrupt politicians, and revive the honor of military service. Joyce Lebra, an American scholar who was an eyewitness, wrote later: “Mishima’s hoarse harangue was nearly drowned out by the shouts and jeers of his incredulous audience and by the noise of helicopters already circling overhead.” After about seven minutes, Mishima went inside to commit ritual suicide, called
seppuku or hara-kiri. Lebra said his last words before disemboweling himself were: “I don’t think they heard me very well.” Of the cold response to Mishima by members of the Self-Defense Agency staff, Lebra concluded: “They are soldiers of contemporary Japan and they, if anyone, should have responded if militarism were resurgent in Japan today.”

Mishima’s works are still read, but his advocacy of military force has fallen on barren ground. A year after his death, only a handful of his followers and a few of the curious showed up to wash his grave and pay their respects. On the 20th anniversary of his death, a small right-wing commemoration went almost unnoticed. Donald Keene, the cultural critic who has lived in Japan for many years, was quoted recently as saying: “I can’t think of a single lasting effect (his death) had.”

In the movies and television, the chambara, or period pieces about samurai swordplay, are as popular as ever. A long-running show is “Abarenbo Shogun,” which could be translated as “Reckless Supreme Commander.” It features a handsome young shogun who disguises himself as a free-spirited warrior with a sense of justice. He goes about with two “ninja” black-suited guardians to right wrongs and punish evil. With his swift sword, the hero dispatches a score of bad guys each week before slipping away to his castle.

Viewers who remember the Lone Ranger and his faithful sidekick, Tonto, would have no trouble recognizing Abarenbo Shogun. Such plays should be seen for what they are, eastern westerns that are a form of escapism. They are like John Wayne movies—fun to watch and the good guys always win, or at least die nobly in the best Japanese tradition.

Japanese motion picture producers have been noticeable in abstaining from making films about the nation’s modern armed force. So much so that Toru Murakawa, a director with the Toei Company, caused a minor stir in 1990 by turning out a film entitled, Best Guy. The story is about a hotshot fighter pilot in the Air Self-Defense Force and features swirling scenes of aerial combat training above the Chitose Air Base in Hokkaido. For the first time in memory, the ASDF cooperated with the filmmakers by putting four F-15 jet fighters at their disposal, rigging them with cameras to record the action in the sky. As with the television show about the shogun, movie-goers who have seen Tom Cruise in Top Gun would understand Best Guy.

At the box office, the picture was a modest success. As a reviewer wrote in the Yomiuri Daily News, an English-language paper in Tokyo, a movie about the Self-Defense Force “is about as popular a subject for New Year’s films as overthrowing the monarchy.” Indeed, the best films of 1990 were about as far from military themes as could be imagined. If anything, they were anti-war and anti-military. The top 10, as rated by an authoritative film magazine, Kinema Junpo, were films about the trials of an all-girls high school, the evacuation of a young boy from Tokyo in World War II, and a failing marriage. Another was Akira Kurosawa’s Yume, or Dreams. In a comedy, a high school boy seeks to become an Olympic swimmer. Others are about the 1960s student movement, the yakuza, or organized gangsters, a chambara period piece, a suspense story around a spoiled girl, and the friendship of a schoolboy for a dying young woman.

A military museum adjacent to the Yasukuni Shrine, the memorial to Japan’s war dead, was refurbished in 1986 after having been closed since the end of World War II. The museum is filled with memorabilia from Japan’s modern wars, including World War II. Here are rising sun battle flags, rifles and artillery pieces, replicas of the kamikaze suicide bombers, and uniforms and pictures of Admiral Yamamoto and General Korechika.
Anami, who committed *seppuku* early in the morning of the day Japan surrendered. The theme of the exhibitions and videos shown regularly is factual and straightforward, with no attempt to glorify Japan's military past. Rather, they appear to be a requiem for the war dead.\(^{106}\)

The museum, however, is notable for what it does not display. While there are pictures of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and the stunning Japanese defeat at sea near the island of Midway, no mention is made of Japan's atrocities from 1931 to 1945. Omitted are any record of the rape of Nanking in China in which unknown thousands of Chinese died, the Bataan death march in which hundreds of American prisoners of war perished in the Philippines, or the death of 13,000 Allied prisoners of war and 80,000 Asian laborers building a railway through the jungles of Thailand and Burma.

Just as most Japanese history textbooks gloss over that period, so the military museum seems to be another example of the Japanese seeing themselves as the victims of World War II instead of the aggressors. The museum does not signify a resurgence of militarism, by any means, but neither does it urge the Japanese to confront the realities of the war in which they set Asia aflame from 1931, when Japan invaded Manchuria, until their defeat in 1945.

The debate over the Japan's role in the Persian Gulf crisis was perhaps the best indicator of the deep Japanese resistance toward acquiring military power. A law that would have permitted the deployment of Japanese non-combatant troops to the Gulf had to be withdrawn because of strong opposition. Even a plan to send several military air transports to ferry refugees was shot down by the political and public protest. The dispatch of the minesweepers after the war drew only grudging public approval.

As both a leader of public opinion and a reflector of Japanese attitudes, the press in Tokyo vigorously opposed a military role for Japan in the Gulf. In an editorial, the *Asahi Shimbun* admonished Prime Minister Kaifu on the crisis: "He must articulate precisely that Japan's policy is to absolutely reject the use of arms in keeping with the spirit of the constitution."\(^{107}\)

*Asahi* surveyed what it called opinion leaders, almost all of whom agreed that Japan's contribution to the gulf situation should be non-military. Later, in an editorial entitled "Keep the SDF Out of It," the newspaper asserted that aiding refugees was a "humanitarian measure that our nation can carry out." But the editorial contended: "The Constitution does not allow the overseas dispatch of the SDF."\(^{108}\)

In an interview with *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, a newspaper like the *Wall Street Journal*, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's secretary general, Ichiro Ozawa, argued for some form of Japanese commitment: "The question is not over the use of military power as a national right but whether we should shoulder a burden as part of a United Nations peacekeeping activity." But he was overruled by the majority of his party.

About 80 writers, television personalities, liberals and leftwing activists, members and former members of the Diet, Christian leaders, women's leaders, and scholars calling themselves Concerned Citizens of Japan took out a full-page advertisement in *The New York Times* in March, 1991, to vent their views on the question of sending Japanese troops to the Persian Gulf:

"We do not want Japan to move closer to translating its awesome economic power into military power. We are surprised at the short memories of Americans who see no danger in this. Our neighbors in Asia are less forgetful."\(^{109}\)
All told, there is little evidence that any Japanese, with the possible exception of fringe groups, wants to see his nation become a military power again. A scholar in Germany, Hanns W. Maull, wrote in the journal *Foreign Affairs*: “Democracy in Japan and Germany today may not be perfect, but it looks strong enough to prevent any return toward militarism, fascism, or nationalistic authoritarianism.” In Japan, he wrote, “there are few signs of a serious radical or militaristic threat to the present political system, and there remains a powerful undercurrent of pacifism with which the experience of the Second World War imbued Japanese society.”

Moreover, Japan has no real need for more than minimal military power. The nation’s basic security is provided by the United States, as the government has acknowledged in the Defense White Paper. Japanese economic interests throughout Asia are protected by a balance of power. No one nation has the military strength to dominate the region, and thus it is not necessary for Japan to have the flag follow trade. Since Japan has already become the pre-eminent economic power in the region, Tokyo would have nothing to gain and much to lose by military action.

After the Gulf war and the criticism aimed at Japan for not having taken part in the coalition, Japanese leaders began searching for ways in which their nation could exert political influence in the international arena. But the underlying theme of that search was reliance on economic, not military, power and on actions such as disaster relief and peacekeeping operations.

Even if Japan succeeds in becoming a forceful political power, and that is far from certain, it is most difficult to imagine a Japanese leader advocating an adventure like that of World War II. Beyond all other reasons, Japan would find it hard to win much if it employed military power because it is situated in one of the most heavily armed regions in the world. The Soviet Union, the United States, the two Koreas, China, Taiwan, and Vietnam all have large armed forces surrounding Japan. Only against the weakest nations in Asia could an aggressive Japanese military force, as constituted now or even with a massive buildup in the future, be used with any expectation of success.

### What Japan Could Do

Setting aside questions of political will and national strategy, the Japanese clearly could build a powerful military force if they so decided. Japan has the economic strength, the managerial and labor skills, the technology and industrial base to become a first-class military power.

With its financial means, Japan could lift its military spending from the present 1 percent of national wealth to 3 percent or 4 percent. In economies less robust than that of Japan, Britain today spends 4.2 percent of its GNP for defense, France 3.8 percent, Germany 2.9 percent. Per capita, the Japanese spend only $236 a year on military power compared with $574 in Germany, $608 in Britain, and $646 in France.

Higher levels of military spending in Japan would mean large tax increases and a diversion of investment from civilian pursuits, and that would take something off Japan’s international competitive edge. But it could be done if the example of the industrial nations of the West are valid.

Japan also has the financial and technical resources to make nuclear weapons. A Japanese strategic thinker said years ago, and recently reaffirmed it, that “Japan is N minus
six months." He meant that Japan could build a nuclear weapon within six months of a political decision to do so.\textsuperscript{112} Nothing to date, however, suggests that the Japanese, who suffered from atomic bombing at Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II, are even remotely considering nuclear arms. Japan's "nuclear allergy" is still pervasive.

For Japan to build a conventional, non-nuclear military force commensurate with its economic strength and the size of its population would require a force slightly over half the size of that of the United States. But Japan's armed forces would be weighted toward seapower rather than land forces because Japan is a maritime nation dependent on trade. Japan is especially dependent on imports of food, fuel, and raw materials because it is poor in those natural resources.

The cost of that force, which Japanese and American officials say has not been calculated by the Japanese government,\textsuperscript{113} could be approximated by measuring it against American costs. That would produce a conservative estimate because Japanese costs for arms, ammunition, equipment, and supplies are higher than those in the United States.

The United States spends about $300 billion a year for defense. If Japan spent 50 percent to 60 percent of that amount, it would come to $150 billion to $180 billion a year. Given the time needed to build modern weapons, it would take the Japanese about 10 years to acquire a proportionate force.

A Japanese military budget could also be calculated by assembling a hypothetical or notional force and determining the cost by applying American costs; this again would underestimate the cost to Japan.\textsuperscript{114}

To protect its sea lanes, especially through the South China Sea, the Straits of Malacca, the Indonesian archipelago, and the Indian Ocean, this imaginary Japanese navy would need eight aircraft carriers as floating bases for 800 fighter and attack planes. Following an American mode of operations, Japan at any one time would have two carriers in home port, two in training near Japan, two deployed in the South China Sea and two deployed in the Indian Ocean. Japan has no carriers today. Each carrier, with its planes, escort ships, and trained flight and ship crews, would cost $20 billion.

In addition, this notional Japanese fleet would require 60 nuclear-powered attack submarines, each costing $1.5 billion, to protect the surface fleet from other submarines and to threaten ships of potential adversaries. Japan today has 14 diesel-electric submarines whose mission is coastal patrol and gathering intelligence on submarines around Japan.

On the surface, Japan would be required to quadruple its fleet of 63 warships today to about 250. Not only would the Japanese navy need 190 new vessels, many would be bigger and more heavily armed than the 2,000-ton to 3,000-ton frigates that comprise the major part of Japan's fleet today. Japan's biggest ship is a 7,200-ton destroyer. The average cost of the new ships would be about $500 million each.

In addition, Japan would need amphibious ships for troops; combat support ships for ammunition, supplies, and fuel; communications and auxiliary vessels. Some 50 ships would average $300 million each. Communications, supplies, and other operating costs would come to $3 billion a year, based on U.S. Navy costs.

To project power from Japan, the hypothetical Japanese air arm would need a fleet of 100 long-range bombers like the American B-1 bomber, of which Japan has none now. Each B-1 costs $280 million. Japan today has 250 older fighter planes and would require 1,000
newer, more high-powered aircraft. About 500 planes would cost $50 million each while another 500 could be had for $20 million apiece.

The key to aerial power projection would be a fleet of flying tankers. Japan's notional air force would require 100 at a cost of $200 million each and 100 aerial transports at a cost of $300 million each. Fuel, missiles, and other costs, based on U.S. Air Force budgets, would come to about $4 billion a year.

On the ground, the imaginary Japanese army would have smaller forces than those of large land powers but would still need six parachute, amphibious, and air assault divisions where it has only a few battalions today. Standing up and sustaining an American division costs about $3 billion a year. Based on 40 percent of other U.S. Army annual costs, the Japanese army would spend between $5 billion and $6 billion a year.

This hypothetical Japanese military force would expand from today's 247,000 men and women to about one million. Training and maintaining each of those 750,000 new men and women would require an average of about $15,000 a year. Over 10 years, that would come to a total of $112.5 billion.

Then the notional force would need a new apparatus for communications, a logistics system, war reserve supplies, new facilities and people for research and development, additional construction of bases, and an extensive apparatus to gather and collate intelligence. The cost would run into tens of billions and would double the cost of weapons and people.

Therefore, it could take Japan $150 billion a year for 10 years to build, train, and assemble an armed force commensurate with its population and economy. That would be five times the current military budget and 5 percent of GNP, compared with 1 percent now.

Moreover, the cost easily could reach $200 billion a year, especially in the early years, for research and development and start-up costs.

Without doubt, Japan has the technological know-how to build world-class ships, tanks, and planes. At first, Japan would need heavy investment in research and development to modernize its forces. An industry observer, for instance, has said that Japanese radar lags behind that of the United States by 10 to 15 years.115

But a nation outpacing the world in shipbuilding, truck manufacture, and electronics could do it. Japan has or could build sufficient industrial plant to produce a flow of arms and equipment. This, too, would mean diverting resources from existing production lines or from new lines intended for civilian products. It would also mean diverting technical and management skills.

In recent years, Japan has steadily increased its self-reliance in defense production. In 1979, Japan produced 85 percent of its equipment. That is now over 90 percent. The Japan Economic Institute in Washington, which is financed by Japan, said in a report: "The Japanese government actively promotes self-reliance in arms production. Tokyo has accepted the diseconomies inherent in military work in order to build a viable defense industrial base."116

While technically on a par with American defense contractors, Japanese companies differ in one significant respect—they are far less dependent on military contracts for sale and income. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, which is perennially the top defense contractor in Japan, gets only 21 percent of its revenues from making weapons such as the Type-90 tank or the F-15 jet fighter, on license from the United States. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, the number two contractor, gets 20 percent of its revenues from defense work. In contrast, General Dynamics and McDonnell-
Japan's Defense Contractors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>1989</th>
<th>1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mitsubishi Heavy Industries</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kawasaki Heavy Industries</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitsubishi Electric Corp.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Ind.</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toshiba Corp.</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEC Corp.</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan Steel Works</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kornsatsu</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuji Heavy Industries</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hitachi</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Japan Economic Institute, Japan Economic Journal.

Douglas, two leading American defense contractors, get 50 percent to 70 percent of their revenues from military contracts.\(^{117}\)

Japanese defense contractors have occasionally been alleged to be eager to export arms. But the Japanese government has maintained a firm ban on such trade and does not appear willing to lift it. After the Toshiba Machine Company was caught selling computer-controlled machine tools to the Soviet Union that ban has been all the more firm. The Toshiba sale, through a Norwegian company, enabled the Soviet navy to make submarines quieter and therefore harder to detect, according to American submariners.\(^{118}\) The Japan Economic Journal said in April, 1991, that Japanese companies were reluctant to sell "dual-use" technology for fear of being accused of fostering arms industries in nations that bought such technology.\(^{119}\) Dual-use equipment, which could be simple, such as trucks, or advanced, such as computers, is intended for civilian use but could be put to military use.

For Japan to obtain the personnel for a larger military force would require conscription, which would divert labor from civilian industry. Today, Japan has only 0.2 percent of its population in the armed forces, compared with 0.57 percent in Britain, 0.81 percent in Germany, and a full 1 percent in France.\(^{120}\)

In sum, Japan has the resources to assemble a powerful armed force. But little in the foreseeable future suggests that the Japanese would be willing to pay the price, not to say the cost of social and economic disruption, of building a first-class force.

What If?

Nothing, however, is forever and a list of "what if's" is not difficult to conceive:

- What if the United States, which has already begun to reduce its forces in Asia, withdraws completely and abandons its posture as a Pacific power?
- What if the Soviet Union rejects perestroika and reverts to an aggressive military role in Asia?
- What if Korea is reunified under a government hostile to Japan, with two enormous Korean armies merged? Or a war breaks out and threatens to flood Japan with refugees?
- What if China resolves its economic and political problems and again becomes an aggressive military power under new leaders?
- What if Vietnam or Indonesia or India threatens the oil lifeline through Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf, whence comes more than half of Japan's oil? That could take Japan back to the 1930s when the perceived prospect of
losing its sources of oil was among the elements that drove Japan into aggression.

• Or what if there is a threat to Japan unseen today?

Under present circumstances, it would probably take two developments to drive Japan into rebuilding a large military force. The most decisive would be the withdrawal of American forces from Asia, as that would remove Japan's acknowledged main line of defense and the guarantor of Japanese security. A withdrawal of that order would include American ground and air forces from South Korea; air, sea, and ground forces from Japan and Okinawa; and air and naval forces from the Philippines. United States forces would retire to Guam and Hawaii.

An American withdrawal would most likely cause the Japanese to reconsider their present defensive posture. If coupled with any of the other "what if's," that would almost certainly cause Japan to acquire a much larger military force. Where that development would lead is impossible to predict.

In any case, it would be more external circumstances, rather than what happens inside Japan, that would determine Japan's military future. Absent an American withdrawal and aggressive moves by Japan's neighbors in Asia, the Japanese will most likely continue for many years with a small, reasonably well-equipped force that is in a distinctly defensive posture.

In sum, it seems that Japan will remain an economic giant and a military pigmy relative to the world's other major and middle-sized powers. A resurgence of Japanese militarism is not on the horizon.

Acknowledgments

I would like to acknowledge the most helpful assistance of many people who commented on this paper at various stages.

Colleagues at the East-West Center who offered incisive suggestions included John Bardach, Richard Baker, Derek Davies, Robert Hewett, Bruce Koppel, Michael Manson, Charles Morrison, Keith Richburg, and John Schidlovsky. Jacqueline D'Orazio was most helpful in designing the cover and printing the report.

In addition, perceptive criticism was received from James Auer of Vanderbilt University and a former official of the Department of Defense; Admiral Ronald Hays, USN (retired), a former commander-in-chief of United States forces in the Pacific; James Kelly, a consultant on Asia and Pacific affairs who is a former senior official in the Defense Department and the White House; Lieutenant General Claude Kicklighter, former commanding general of United States Army forces in the Pacific; Colonel Charles Kinsey, of General Kicklighter's senior staff; and Colonel William Wise, USAF, a senior staff officer at the Pacific Command's headquarters in Hawaii.

Several others who requested anonymity also reviewed the paper. As ever, my wife, Fumiko Mori Halloran, who is an accomplished writer, was supportive and critical at the same time. To all I am deeply grateful, but they must be absolved of any responsibility for the facts and assessments—and mistakes—in the paper, for that is mine alone.

Notes

12. The Rising Tide, p. 10.
13. Ibid., p. 19.
41. Procurement Programs, p. F-2.
43. Ibid., p. 304.
52. Ibid., p. A-29.
69. Ibid., p. 332.
70. This formulation is the author's, but it has been tested with thoughtful Japanese.
71. See Emmerson, pp. 55, 77.
81. Ibid., p. 85.
82. Ibid., p. 95.
84. *Japan Times*, May 4, 1991, p. 1
87. For a full exposition on *samurai* and *bushido*, see George Sansom, *A History of Japan to 1334* (Stanford, California: Stanford University
88. Benedict, op. cit., p. 175.


98. Quoted in Emmerson, p. 105.


102. Seen in Tokyo; reruns are also seen regularly in Hawaii.


106. The author spent several hours in the museum in May, 1991.


114. Cost figures in this passage are based on the Department of Defense’s 1990 publication, “Program, Acquisition Costs by Weapon System,” also known as P-1.


116. Ibid., p. 7.

117. Ibid., p. 5.

118. Conversations with the author over several years in Washington and Honolulu.


## Appendix A

### World Military Powers (1988)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Number in Armed Forces</th>
<th>Spending ($ billion)</th>
<th>Spending Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>5,100,000</td>
<td>200.0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2,100,000</td>
<td>260.3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1,300,000</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>1,300,000</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>650,000</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>635,000</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>604,000</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>520,000</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>489,000</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>457,000</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>445,000</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>406,000</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>406,000</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>404,000</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>386,000</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>319,000</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>317,000</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>316,000</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>309,000</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>284,000</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>256,000</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>247,000</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Is Japanese Militarism Resurgent?* 25
## Appendix B

### Military Forces in Asia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Total Forces</th>
<th>Ground Troops</th>
<th>Tanks</th>
<th>Artillery</th>
<th>Aircraft Carriers</th>
<th>Attack Submarines</th>
<th>Surface Warships</th>
<th>Amphibious Ships</th>
<th>Bombers</th>
<th>Fighters</th>
<th>Transports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China*</td>
<td>3.0 mil</td>
<td>2.3 mil</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>18,300</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>5,200</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India*</td>
<td>1.3 mil</td>
<td>1.1 mil</td>
<td>3,250</td>
<td>4,120</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>1.3 mil</td>
<td>1.1 mil</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Korea</td>
<td>1.0 mil</td>
<td>930,000</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>7,200</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Korea</td>
<td>650,000</td>
<td>550,000</td>
<td>2,550</td>
<td>4,280</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>520,000</td>
<td>480,000</td>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>405,000</td>
<td>270,000</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>1,375</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>285,000</td>
<td>215,000</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>283,000</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>247,000</td>
<td>156,000</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>114,500</td>
<td>105,000</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>112,000</td>
<td>68,000</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>69,600</td>
<td>31,300</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>55,500</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Known to have nuclear capability; weapons not included here.

Appendix C

Rankings in Indicators of Military Power
Japan and Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spending</th>
<th>Manpower</th>
<th>Ground Power</th>
<th>Tactical Air</th>
<th>Navy Tonnage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>W. Germany</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Germany</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>W. Germany</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>W. Germany</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>W. Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Appendix D

Combat Naval Tonnage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
<th>Vessels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>7,666,000</td>
<td>2,990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>6,428,000</td>
<td>1,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>2,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>977,000</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>492,000</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Japan</strong></td>
<td><strong>303,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>170</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>277,000</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>255,000</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>246,000</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>222,000</td>
<td>620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>206,000</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>198,000</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>191,000</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>156,000</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>148,000</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>147,000</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Figures may differ from other reports because coastal patrol ships, auxiliaries, and other vessels are counted in some accounts but not in others.
THE EAST-WEST CENTER is a public, nonprofit educational insti-
tution established in Hawaii in 1960 by the United States Congress
with a mandate "to promote better relations and understanding among
the nations of Asia, the Pacific, and the United States through cooper­
ative study, training, and research."

Some 2,000 research fellows, graduate students and professionals in
business and government each year work with the Center's interna­
tional staff on major Asia-Pacific issues relating to population, eco­
nomic and trade policies, resources and development, the environment,
culture and communication, and international relations. Since 1960,
more than 25,000 men and women from the region have participated
in the Center's cooperative programs.

Principal funding for the Center comes from the United States Con­
gress. Support also comes from more than 20 Asian and Pacific govern­
ments, as well as private agencies and corporations. The Center has
an international board of governors.